A Firm and Flexible Exit Strategy?

David C. Stolinsky, MD
Dec. 7, 2009

Testifying before Congress following President Obama’s speech at West Point, Defense Secretary Gates declared that the July 2011 date for our withdrawal from Afghanistan is both “firm and flexible.”

Like the president, Gates did not refer to “victory” or “winning.” A word count of the president’s speech gave these results: “I” was used 45 times, “Afghanistan” was used 39 times, and “victory” was used 0 times. If there is a clearer indication of President Obama’s priorities, I have yet to see it.

Referring to the U.S. Military Academy, MSNBC’s Chris Matthews declared that Obama was going to speak in the “enemy camp” where Bush went to “rabble rouse.” Matthews later apologized, but obviously West Point does not give him a thrill up his leg. If there is a clearer indication of the liberal media’s attitude toward our troops − that is, “enemy rabble” − I have yet to see that, either.

Instead of victory, Gates referred to the “severe consequences” of failure. Avoiding failure may sound similar to success. But in business, there is a big difference between breaking even and making a profit.

In war, the difference is even greater. Only a fool would equate withdrawing from a difficult position with defeating the enemy. Consider this quotation from the commanding general of the First Marine Division on Guadalcanal, our first island victory against Japan in World War II:

Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.
− A. A. Vandegrift, General, USMC

That is the mindset of a leader intent on victory, as opposed to a politician attempting to achieve two incompatible goals. Obama is trying to placate his pacifist, isolationist, anti-military, leftist base. But at the same time, he is trying not to antagonize independents by presiding over failure in Afghanistan, which he calls the “war of necessity.”

What if Taliban leader Mullah Omar made a similar speech, declaring that he intended to withdraw his fighters from Afghanistan in 2011? We would rejoice, concluding that he was announcing his surrender 18 months in advance. If we would conclude that, what do you suppose the Taliban and Al Qaeda will conclude from the president’s speech?

● If you were an Afghan villager, would you continue to help the Americans, knowing that soon they will leave you to the tender mercies of the Taliban?

● If you were an Afghan official, would you still work with the Americans, or would you make a deal with the Taliban, who have no “exit strategy”?

● If you were an Afghan parent, would you continue to send your daughters to school, only to have them risk having acid thrown in their faces by savages who believe that women must be kept in ignorance?

● If you were an Afghan doctor or nurse, would you continue to work in an American-sponsored hospital, or would you yield to threats and quit?

● If you were a Pakistani, would you continue to oppose the Taliban, when the Americans will soon be gone?

● If you were a member of Al Qaeda, would you consider quitting, just when things are about to improve?

● If you were an enemy of America, would you be frightened or encouraged?

● If you were an ally of America, would you consider sending more troops to Afghanistan, when the president’s speech was so uninspiring and half-hearted? (This may be an overestimate.)

The president is convincing when he believes in what he is selling. He was an extremely effective campaigner − he was selling himself. He was less effective selling government-run health care. And he was even less effective speaking about Afghanistan. His lack of enthusiasm was obvious. If it was obvious to Americans, why should it be less obvious to our friends − and our enemies?

This brings us to that frequently used phrase, “exit strategy.” It is not listed in the 1987 Random House Unabridged Dictionary. It was first used in business, as a description of how a company could rid itself of an unprofitable activity. But it came to be applied to foreign and military policy.

I believe “exit strategy” was first used in this connection by Bill Clinton’s first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in reference to our withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia. Revealingly, Christopher is a lawyer. He had previously served in the State Department under Jimmy Carter.

Even more revealingly, Christopher attended a planning session for the operation to rescue 53 American diplomatic hostages. They had been kidnapped when the Iranians seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran − an act of war − in 1979. Col. Charlie Beckwith, the commander of Delta Force, was asked what would happen if Iranian guards were encountered. He replied that they would be “taken out.”

Christopher then asked why they couldn’t just be “shot in the shoulder.” (See “Delta Force,” page 7.) His ignorance of combat was not altered when the rescue mission failed miserably, resulting in eight deaths of the rescuers but no hostages freed. They were freed later, after 444 days of captivity, on the day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. No doubt the Iranians felt that Reagan would be interested less in exiting and more in winning.

Later Christopher chaired a commission that investigated the Los Angeles Police Department. When a caller asked why armed suspects couldn’t just have the gun “shot out of their hands,” Christopher replied that this should be considered. (I heard him.)

Like many liberals, he had learned nothing from history. He still believed that lethal force could be countered by less-than-lethal force. He still was more concerned with legal niceties than with the lives of those for whom he was responsible. When confronted by danger, his first thought was of an “exit strategy.” In 2008, Christopher served as a foreign-policy advisor to President-elect Obama, who was also trained as a lawyer.

Running away may sometimes work if a person is trying to avoid a mugger. But it cannot work for a nation involved in a lethal confrontation with fanatics who intend to destroy it. We cannot run away from enemies who are already here in America. We cannot have an “exit strategy” from our own home − and our own civilization.

We must confront our enemies, using whatever force is necessary. We cannot try to “shoot in the shoulder” people who are trying to blow us up, knock down our buildings and cut our throats. We cannot temporize with fanatics who are building nuclear weapons. We cannot be both “firm and flexible.” We cannot set a date to end a “war of necessity.” We cannot ignore what George Orwell taught us: “The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it.”

Ambiguous words and equivocal statements may have some use in legal maneuvers, but to enemies and friends alike, they convey a picture of weakness and indecision. Rather than obsessing about an “exit strategy,” we would do better to heed these words:

Unarmed men, and unarmed nations, can only flee from evil. And evil is not overcome by fleeing from it.
− John D. “Jeff” Cooper, Lt. Col., USMC

Isn’t fleeing from evil the very essence of an “exit strategy”?

December 7 is Pearl Harbor Day. A day later, a different president delivered a different speech.

● Obama’s speech took 34 minutes; this speech took only six and one-half minutes.

● Obama’s speech used the word “I” 45 times; this speech used “I” only five times.

● Obama’s speech was uninspiring and lukewarm; this speech was stirring and heartfelt.

● Obama’s speech was an unsuccessful attempt to placate both liberals and conservatives; this speech was a successful attempt to inspire everyone but placate no one.

● Obama’s speech defined an “exit strategy;” this speech eloquently affirmed the exact opposite. Listen to these words:

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory… With confidence in our armed forces − with the unbounding determination of our people − we will gain the inevitable triumph − so help us God.
− President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dec. 8, 1941, address to Congress

Dr. Stolinsky writes on political and social issues. He can be contacted at dstol@prodigy.net.

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